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 Abstract 
Database Anonymization Services 
 
Chad B. Meador 
 
The progress of technology and the development of powerful databases have made it 
possible to store and easily access continually increasing amounts of sensitive data about 
people.  Since personal information is becoming common in many different databases, it 
is vital that this data be hidden to ensure privacy of the individuals whose records are 
stored in these repositories.  Database anonymization is the key to securing these 
databases by ensuring that database users will be unable to reveal sensitive personal 
information by intelligently structuring their queries. 
   
We analyzed the structure of the BiomData database which contains images and sound 
recordings of six biometric modalities acquired from hundreds of volunteers.  To ensure 
the confidentiality of these volunteers, our goal was to prevent queries which would 
allow database users to obtain images of easily identifiable biometric data (facial images, 
for example) together with the corresponding images of modalities for which user's 
anonymity is required (fingerprint images, for example).  ERUCES Tricryption® Engine 
was used to anonymize the links between the six biometric modality tables contained in 
the database, thereby enhancing privacy of volunteers who participate in the biometric 
collection study while promoting an open data sharing research environment. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
With the progress of commerce, credit, and legal and medical services, the need to 
maintain information about people is a mandatory part of doing business.  All modern 
governments and businesses must be able to keep detailed records about individuals, 
which entails storing information about them in some type of database.  The progress of 
technology and the development of very powerful databases have made it possible to 
store and easily access continually increasing amounts of data about people.  This data 
often includes very sensitive information such as social security numbers, one of the most 
popular identifiers utilized.  Some simpler databases for general commercial uses may 
store little or none of this sensitive information; however, databases dealing with 
banking, credit reporting, healthcare, or legal and tax services often contain very large 
amounts.  Since this personal information is becoming so common in many different 
databases, it is extremely important that this sensitive data be hidden in some way in 
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order to ensure privacy to the individuals whose information is residing in them.  
Database anonymization is the key to securing these databases by making certain that an 
individual who has access to the database will be unable to also gain access to sensitive 
personal information about the subjects stored within. 
 
 
1.2 Government Regulations 
 
The government has been taking an active role in attempting to help ensure protection of 
individual’s privacy.  It is extremely important that the government creates regulations 
and laws that help protect this privacy because it is not uncommon for businesses to turn 
a blind eye to some security issues for the simple sake of not spending the money to 
remedy the problem, and avoid the loss of business and hindered reputation that occurs as 
a result of a known security breach to a company’s computer systems.  Some recent 
regulations cited by Khulusi are HIPAA, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, SB-1386, and the 
Data Protection Act, which are helping to mandate the protection of sensitive 
government, financial, health, and other information [9].   
 
HIPAA stands for Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.  This Act 
requires the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish national 
standards for electronic health care transactions and national identifiers for providers, 
health plans, and employers. It also addresses the security and privacy of health data. 
Adopting these standards will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the nation's 
health care system by encouraging the widespread use of electronic data interchange in 
health care [14]. 
 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley or GLB Act is also known as the Financial Modernization Act 
of 1999.  The main provisions of this act are to protect the personal financial information 
of consumers that is held by financial institutions.  Financial institutions in this context 
refers to organizations such as banks, security firms, insurance companies, and basically 
any companies providing some type of financial product or service to consumers. 
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SB-1386 is a regulation that became effective in California in July 2003.  SB-1386, also 
known as the Security Breach Information Act, requires the public disclosure of 
computer security breaches in which private information of any California resident may 
have been compromised.  This law also requires reasonable security controls around 
California resident data within organizations and their business partners. 
 
The Data Protection Act, which is a regulation in Europe, regulates how personal 
information is used and protects from misuse of personal details.  This act is hinged on 
eight basic principles that an individual’s personal information is:  fairly and lawfully 
processed; processed for limited purposes; adequate, relevant, and not excessive; 
accurate; not kept longer than necessary; processed in accordance with your rights; kept 
secure; and is not transferred abroad without adequate protection [8]. 
 
 
1.3 Privacy Threats 
 
Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to stop information about themselves from 
becoming known to people other than those they choose to give the information to.  
Privacy is sometimes related to anonymity although it is often most highly valued by 
people who are publicly known. Privacy can be seen as an aspect of security—one in 
which trade-offs between the interests of one group and another can become particularly 
clear [15]. 
 
It has become quite clear that numerous threats to privacy can arise from the rather large 
amounts of personal data that government and commercial organizations are gathering 
and storing about individuals today.  These threats exist because repositories where data 
reside are vulnerable not only to dangerous hackers with malicious intent, but also to 
insider abuse.  Identity theft, in particular is a threat that has caught on as one of the 
hottest new forms of crime arising from advances in modern technology.  Identity theft is 
a major problem because of the degree of trouble it can cause to a person.  Aside from the 
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feeling of violation of one’s privacy, recovering from identity theft can be a very time-
consuming, expensive, and frustrating experience that was caused through no fault of the 
individual whose identity was stolen. 
 
Data theft is another large threat to privacy.  Information can be stolen from a database 
with the intentions of such things as financial gain from, discrimination against, or 
gaining advantage over the person or group whose information was stolen, depending on 
the type and amount of information that is stolen.   
 
Prevention of data tampering and maintenance of data integrity are two other important 
threats to privacy that need to constantly be addressed.  Data tampering can be a threat to 
a person’s financial well-being in the case that a hacker accessed an individual’s bank 
account and illegally transferred funds from their account.  This could also affect a 
person’s health in the event that a hacker were to break into a healthcare database and 
modify such information as prescription types and dosages leading to an innocent 
individual possibly taking medications that could lead to serious medical problems.  
Maintaining data integrity is also important as data that is modified or deleted through 
result of malicious activity or some type of system error or failure can also lead to major 
problems for an individual who that data is referencing. 
 
The large amounts of data that are being used and shared are going to continue to 
increase along with the number of databases that are being used to store this data.  These 
databases will always be targets for computer criminals and as such these issues of 
identity theft, data theft, data tampering, and data integrity are serious threats to privacy, 
and need to constantly be addressed in the security standards and protocols of database 
systems.   
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1.4 Database Security Problems 
 
As previously discussed, databases may store large amounts of sensitive, personal 
identifying information.  The problem occurring is that most databases are vulnerable to 
attacks which can lead to serious issues such as identity theft.  In addition to this 
vulnerability of most systems to outsider attacks, even the most secure databases that 
prevent these outsider attacks remain vulnerable to insider misuse and theft [9].   
 
A typical person in today’s society does business with several different organizations that 
store their personal information.  This includes all information maintained by the 
government, financial institutions, lawyers, hospitals, doctors, insurance companies, 
employers, and even retailers and eCommerce companies.  With an individual conducting 
business with all of these organizations, that person can have sensitive information stored 
possibly in hundreds of different databases.  The threat to this person’s sensitive 
information is as high as the likelihood of the least secure of these database repositories 
being broken into.  In simpler terms this means that it doesn’t matter that a person’s 
sensitive information is secure in most databases that it resides in.  If that person has 
information stored in a database that is very prone to a malicious attack then it does them 
no good that their data is safe everywhere else. The least secure of these databases is the 
weakest link in the chain and the threat to a person’s information is only as strong as this 
weakest link.  Since it is not a feasible task to ensure that all databases that store personal 
information are at a certain level of security, another solution must be devised to address 
this problem. 
 
Another problem that exists is that electronic data is constantly released and must meet 
privacy demands of the individuals whose personal information is being disclosed by the 
process.  Naive approaches to de-identifying these database records can lead to attacks 
that combine the data with other publicly available information to re-identify the records 
and discover the identity of the individuals represented.  For example, consider a dataset 
of patient diagnoses that has had all personal identifiers removed.  The records in the 
dataset do not contain a single identifying value; however, many of the records are likely 
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to contain unique value combinations.  Take for instance, a represented individual who is 
the only male born in 1930 living in a city with a small population.  This individual’s age, 
gender, and zip code could be joined with a publicly available voter registry from the area 
to obtain the person’s name, thus revealing their medical history [2]. 
 
 
1.5 The Solution:  Database Anonymization 
 
Database anonymization is a solution that can to eliminate threats such as identity theft, 
data theft, and data tampering while ensuring individual privacy and data integrity.  
Anonymization is used in databases to de-identify sensitive attributes from their 
corresponding identifiers.  In addition, anonymization helps to ensure privacy to 
information that has had personal identifiers removed and has been made publicly 
available, but still faces the possibility of being combined with other publicly available 
information to re-identify carelessly de-identified records.  Anonymization can be done in 
various ways using various methods depending upon the type of database being 
anonymized and the actual motivation behind the anonymization.   
 
 
1.6 BiomData Oracle Database 
 
Biometrics is an interdisciplinary field involving personnel from varied organizations 
ranging from statistics to computer science to law enforcement agencies such as the CIA 
and FBI.  There is currently no centralized system that is available to store data in a 
secure, reliable, and organized fashion for research use.  The BiomData Database has 
been constructed with the goal of providing the necessary biometric dataset for the 
research community [3].  This is the database that we will be performing anonymization 
on to de-identify different biometric modalities so that the non-identifiable modalities 
(i.e. iris, fingerprint, palm print) can not be linked to the identifiable ones (i.e. face, 
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voice).  This will be done through the use of Tricryption which is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2 of this document. 
 
 
1.7 System Features 
 
The BiomData database is being specially designed to meet the needs of personnel in the 
field of biometric research and testing and it possesses many special attributes making it 
unique including the following: 
 
• Multi-Modal 
• Centralized 
• Reliable, Flexible, and Accurate 
• Web-Enabled 
• Time Series Biometric Data 
• Template Aging or Biometric Aging 
• Statistical Data 
• Processed Data and Reusability (Templates, Match Scores) 
• High Security 
 
The BiomData database is designed to provide data for the community of researchers in 
the biometric field.  This version of the database stores images and sound recordings for 
six distinct biometric modalities: face, fingerprint, hand geometry, iris, voice and palm. 
Biometric data can be shared among researchers from different organizations.  Data is 
stored per organization and collection.  Collections are divided into sessions and sessions 
are divided into records. Images for different biometric modalities are stored in different 
tables.  The design allows using multiple scanners for one biometric modality in the same 
session for the same subject.  The design also allows both single captures and also time 
series captures.  In order to keep data in the database consistent, some database fields are 
restricted to certain values [3]. 
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1.8 Our Contribution 
 
It is extremely vital that a methodology be developed for secure sharing of the data 
contained in the BiomData biometric test database.  This methodology needs to include 
data confidentiality, data integrity, non-repudiation of the data, automated de-
identification, and accountability of testers and test organizations accessing the database.  
Our task in better securing the BiomData database focuses mainly on ensuring 
confidentiality of the biometric data for all subjects stored in the database.   
 
The BiomData database includes six separate tables containing the data for six different 
biometric modalities including face, finger, hand, palm, iris, and voice.  The database 
also contains a record table which acts as a bridge between the six biometric modality 
tables and the rest of the information related to the subjects in the database.  Our task 
involves anonymizing the links between these tables to ensure confidentiality of the 
subjects in the database.  Confidentiality will be ensured because when the tables are 
anonymized, users will not be able to recover the true assignment of non-identifiable 
features, such as iris, fingerprint, and palm print, to identifiable features, such as face and 
voice.  The de-identification of these records will minimize the risks of individualizing 
images in different modalities, thereby enhancing privacy for data sharing and 
simplifying security policies and administration. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Related Work 
 
2.1 ERUCES Tricryption® Engine 
 
To aid us in this project, ERUCES, Inc. allowed us to use the Tricryption® Engine 
software suite for our experimental setup.  The ERUCES Tricryption® Engine is a 
patent-pending encryption solution that is used to secure sensitive information stored in a 
database.  This is accomplished using standard algorithms along with key management to 
protect data from theft and tampering, ensuring privacy and integrity in the database.  
Tricryption claims to eliminate intruder and insider threats to the databases security. 
 
The Tricryption® Engine encrypts individual fields, records, or objects within a database 
using unique, variable lifetime keys.  These keys are stored in a protected database in a 
separate domain keeping them securely away from the encrypted data.  The links between 
the encrypted data and the corresponding keys are also encrypted. 
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The full process is detailed below [5]: 
• Sensitive data to be encrypted is selected by the user, and a request for 
encryption is sent 
• A randomly generated, transaction-based symmetric key is created; and a 
random Key ID is created 
• The key is encrypted 
• The encrypted key and its Key ID are stored in a Key Database 
• The Key ID is encrypted, producing a Hidden Link 
• The data is encrypted 
• The encrypted data and the Hidden Link are returned to the user 
• The encrypted data and the key used to encrypt it are completely separated, 
both physically and logically, and the link between them is hidden. 
 
Tricryption provides many advantages for data-at-rest security.  First, when Tricryption is 
used, the protected data and the encrypted keys are stored separately.  Next, Tricryption 
uses an unlimited number of keys based on the number of transactions as opposed to 
using a single key or a fixed number of keys.  In addition, the complexity of the 
scrambling system used in Tricryption increases with every single transaction, thus 
adding to the difficulty of a successful crypto attack.  And finally, even if a malicious 
user were to steal the information database and the key database, the protected data is 
useless outside of the ERUCES system.  The reason for this is the combination of the 
unlimited number of keys and the complexity of the scrambling system used.  Even 
though the malicious user has the keys used to encrypt the data, there are an unlimited 
number of them so the user would have to first somehow figure out which keys were used 
to encrypt which data, then figure out the algorithm used to encrypt the data so he or she 
could in turn decrypt it. 
 
The following are security features incorporated in the ERUCES Tricryption Engine: 
 
• Standard crypto algorithms including 3DES, AES, and RC4. 
• Smart monitoring system with alerts. 
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• Secure key audit log with reporting. 
• Validation of integrity of encrypted data and keys during decryption. 
• Accepts requests from only registered and authenticated components. 
• Background digital certificates verification. 
• Local/Domain Certificate Authority (CA). 
 
 
2.2 Dedicated Identity Database 
 
Khulusi proposes a method of database anonymization with the underlying principle of 
transferring the threat to individuals’ privacy from the weakest databases that contain 
their personal information to the strongest and most secure database which can be 
referred to as a Dedicated Identity Database.  The strongest and most secure database can 
be defined as the database which stores valuable information, personal identifying 
information in this case, and grants access to authorized individuals, with a legitimate 
business need, for the use of such data, but prevents anyone else from using, stealing or 
tampering with such data.  In particular, this database must specifically prevent insider 
misuse of the data.  The malicious insider problem is the most difficult problem to solve 
because insiders, like database administrators, programmers, systems administrators and 
engineers typically have unlimited access to the raw data.  The hacker or malicious 
outsider problem can also be boiled down to a malicious insider problem.  In the event a 
hacker somehow gains administrator privileges it doesn’t matter if it is an administrator 
or a hacker because after the hacker has breached the database and attained administrator 
privileges, he or she is basically an insider while accessing the database [9].  The weakest 
databases can in turn be defined as the databases which use less security features and are 
more prone to attacks and insider abuse. 
 
Transferring the threat to an individual’s privacy from the weakest databases that contain 
their personal information to the strongest and most secure database is done by only 
storing personal identifying information in the Dedicated Identity Database meaning that 
the threat of an attacker or insider accessing and possibly tampering with or stealing a 
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person’s personal information will reduce significantly because it resides only in the most 
secure database.  In this anonymization of databases, the Dedicate Identity Database will 
contain all sensitive personal information and other databases that may or may not be less 
secure will hold any other information that is not sensitive.  In this manner a hacker or 
malicious insider may be able to access in a database such information as transaction 
data, medical records, items purchased or sold, or tax information to name a few, but will 
not be able to see the personal data related to it thus making the data they can see useless.  
An example of this given by Bassam Khulusi is “what good is it to know that somebody 
was treated for a psychological illness, when there is no name, social security number, 
address, or anything of a personal nature attached to that information [9].”  With this lack 
of access to the personal information, identity theft is not possible. Data tampering would 
be pointless unless it were being performed to simply “vandalize” a database, but still 
could not be targeted at a specific known individual in the database. 
 
In Khulusi’s Dedicated Identity Database all personal identifying information is stored 
and is accessed by the weaker and less secure databases that have access to the data only 
on a need to know basis.  A pseudo-identity is created in the less secure databases which 
is a cryptographically generated pseudonym used for accessing each individual identity in 
the Dedicated Identity Database.  This cryptographically generated pseudonym is the 
only thing relating an individual’s sensitive information in the Dedicated Identity 
Database to any other non-sensitive data in one of the weaker databases.  This is the 
concept of de-identification in which the person’s sensitive information is continuously 
de-identified from their non-sensitive information meaning there is no identity attached to 
the non-sensitive information.  This data in the weaker databases is therefore said to be 
anonymous because instead of being stored with a person’s name, social security number, 
and other sensitive information, it is stored only with a cryptographically generated 
pseudonym.  If one of the weaker databases does actually need sensitive data for an 
individual, a request must be sent to the Dedicated Identity Database and only through 
the submission of this legitimate request could the needed identifying information be 
obtained [9]. 
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2.3 K-Anonymization 
 
K-Anonymization is a technique that is also used to de-identify sensitive attributes from 
their corresponding identifiers.  This anonymization approach is used to address the 
problems created by the large amounts of information that are publicly available that 
cause questions to be raised about the protection of individual’s privacy.  Zhong points 
out that this particularly includes large datasets containing sensitive information (e.g., 
healthcare information) that are available for public access and simply have the sensitive 
identifiers stripped off in an attempt to protect privacy of the individual’s whose 
information is published [16].  A privacy issue is encountered when it becomes possible 
to use this information, in conjunction with some other type of publicly available 
database, to associate a person’s corresponding identifiers.  This was previously 
discussed in section 1.4 of this document in the example given regarding a public medical 
database and voter lists being used to find out private information about an individual’s 
medical conditions and history. 
 
A k-anonymized dataset has the property that each record is indistinguishable from at 
least k-1 others.  Zhong gives the following example to illustrate a k-anonymized table 
where k is equal to 2.  For this example, each record will be indistinguishable from at 
least one other record in the table since the table is 2-anonymized. 
 
Consider a table containing health information of medical studies as shown in Table 1.  
Each record includes a patient’s date of birth, zip code, allergy, and history of illness.  
Although the identifier of each patient does not explicitly appear in this table, a dedicated 
adversary may be able to derive the identifiers of some patients using the combinations of 
date of birth and zip code. For example, he may be able to find that his roommate is the 
patient of the first row, who has allergy to penicillin and a history of pharyngitis. 
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Date of Birth Zip Code Allergy History of  Illness 
03-24-79 07030 Penicillin Pharyngitis 
08-02-57 07028 No Allergy Stroke 
11-12-39 07030 No Allergy Polio 
08-02-57 07029 Sulfur Diphtheria 
08-01-40 07030 No Allergy Colitis 
 
Table 2.1:  Table of Health Data 
 
In this example the set of attributes {date of birth, zip code} is referred to as a quasi-
identifier, because these attributes can be used in combination to identify an individual.  
Attributes such as allergy and history of illness are referred to as sensitive attributes.  The 
privacy threat that is being considered is that the adversary may be able to link the 
sensitive attributes of some rows to their corresponding identifiers using the quasi-
identifiers.  The strategy devised to alleviate this threat is to make the table k-anonymous. 
 
Date of Birth Zip Code Allergy History of  Illness 
* 07030 Penicillin Pharyngitis 
08-02-57 0702* No Allergy Stroke 
* 07030 No Allergy Polio 
08-02-57 0702* Sulfur Diphtheria 
* 07030 No Allergy Colitis 
 
Table 2.2:  2-Anonymized Table of Health Data 
 
In this k-anonymous table, each value of the quasi-identifier appears at least k times.  
Zhong states in this example that if the adversary only uses the quasi-identifiers to link 
sensitive attributes to the identifiers, then each involved entity (patients in this example) 
is “hidden” in at least k peers.  Two methods that Zhong points out of achieving this k-
anonymization are generalization and suppression which are both used in this example.  
In the above example suppression is illustrated in the “date of birth” field where some 
entries are replaced with a “*”.  Generalization is illustrated in the “zip code” field where 
some of the entries are only partially displayed (e.g. replacing some or all occurrences of 
“07028” and “07029” with “0702*”). 
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Chapter 3 
 
Case Study 
 
3.1 BiomData Database Structure 
 
As previously stated, the BiomData database has been constructed as a centralized system 
available to the biometric research community, which contains biometric data stored in a 
secure, reliable, and organized fashion.  This is a quite complex database including 27 
tables with 34 different relationships linking the tables.  There are six separate tables 
containing the data for six different biometric modalities including Face, Finger, Hand, 
Palm, Iris, and Voice.  There exists a Record table which acts as a bridge between the six 
biometric modality tables and the rest of the information related to the subjects in the 
database.  And finally, there is a Subject table that contains various sensitive and non-
sensitive information about the subject’s whose biometric data is stored.  This report 
describes the process of anonymizing the links between the Record table, the Subject 
table, and the six biometric modality tables to ensure confidentiality of the subjects in the 
database.  Confidentiality needs to be ensured because in the current schema, users are 
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able to recover the true assignment of non-identifiable features, such as iris, fingerprint, 
and palm print, to identifiable features, such as face and voice.  The de-identification of 
these records will minimize the risks of individualizing images in different modalities 
thereby enhancing privacy for data sharing and simplifying security policies and 
administration. 
 
 
3.2 Original Database Schema 
 
The original structure of the tables that will be affected by the anonymization of the 
database is shown in Figure 3.1: 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1:  Partial View of the Original BiomData Database Schema 
 
In Figure 3.1, the bolded fields represent the primary keys in the tables.  It can be 
observed that each modality table contains a pair of fields for the primary key.  The first 
of these fields is a Record ID field which is used to link each record in the modality table 
to its corresponding record in the Record table.  The records in the Record table are then 
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related to the Subject table through two separate fields, which are used as a composite 
primary key in the Subject table.  These two fields are unique identifiers for each subject 
in the database.  It can also be observed that there are two copies of the Subject table 
shown.  There are not actually two separate Subject tables in the database.  This simply 
illustrates that two separate relationships exist between the Record and Subject tables. 
 
 
3.3 Table Modifications 
 
In the anonymization process we will first de-identify the relationship between the 
Record and Subject tables.  Next, the Record table will be split into two tables: 
Record_Spiis and Record_Nspiis.  Record_Spiis contains the sensitive data, and 
Record_Nspiis contains the non-sensitive data (Spii in the table name means sensitive 
personal identification information and Nspii in the table name means non-sensitive 
personal identification information).  There should be no direct link between the 
Record_Spiis and Record_Nspiis tables.  Figure 3.2 shows the original Record table and 
the two new tables created after the table is split. 
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REC
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REC
DateTime
New Record_Nspiis Table
Figure 3.2:  Record Table Modifications 
 
From the above figure it can be seen that three new fields (shown in bold) are introduced 
into the Record_Nspiis table.  These fields are the hidden links that are used to traverse 
amongst the split record tables and the six modality tables.  These hidden links are 
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produced by encrypting the randomly generated symmetric keys for each record and 
encrypting the random key id that is assigned to each key.  The fields REC_EdiHLdi and 
REC_EriHLdi are two different encrypted keys and the HLri is the encrypted key id 
associated with the REC_EriHLdi key. 
 
Each of the modality tables contains a new field that acts as a hidden link to associate the 
modality table to the Record_Nspiis table.  This field is the encrypted key id associated 
with the REC_EdiHLdi in the Record Table.  These encrypted key id’s are completely 
separated, both physically and logically, the links between them are hidden.  This can be 
observed in Figure 3.3, which illustrates the modifications to the Face table.  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
FCI
RecordID
FCI
ImageNr
FCI
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FCI
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FCI
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FCI
DateTime
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FCI
EdiHLdi
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DateTime
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Modified Face Table
Original Face Table
Figure 3.3:  Modality Table Modifications 
 
Each of the modality tables will be modified in the same way as the Face table which is 
shown above.  The field in each modality table that contains the Record ID will be 
replaced with a new field that contains the hidden link associating the given table to the 
Record_Nspiis table.  These links will make it impossible to associate an identifiable 
feature to a non-identifiable feature such as a fingerprint to a face scan. 
 
 
3.4 Modified Database Schema 
 
Upon modification of the database, the six modality tables will contain a hidden link to 
the associated record in the Record_Nspiis table.  The Record_Nspiis table and 
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Record_Spiis tables will be completely de-identified and hidden links will be contained 
in both to associate the related records.  The Subject table will then only be related to the 
Record_Spiis table via 2 separate relationships using the two fields that represent the 
composite key in the Subject table.  The new structure of the database can be seen in 
Figure 3.4, and Tables 3.1-3.3 illustrate a generic view of how the data would look in the 
tables under the new schema. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4:  Modified Database Schema 
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RECORD_SPIIS TABLE 
REC 
RecordID 
REC 
RandomID 
REC 
Restricted
REC 
OrganizationID HLDi
1 1135462 Y 1 ACEx0aZG1CpDv… 
2 2987698 N 2 ACEx0SxzJVANh… 
3 1145539 N 3 ACEx0UYDsG91X… 
4 2193334 Y 4 ACEx0UgoBXaC7… 
5 3490046 N 5 ACEx0eeeer4LB7… 
6 2287654 Y 6 ACEx0V2Q0djom… 
 
Table 3.1:  New Record_Spiis Table 
 
RECORD_NSPIIS TABLE 
EDi ERi HLRi
REC 
Biometric
REC 
CollectionID ….. 
kXE3sFcE+Jx… GxINhfUZ/ufCP… ACEx0aZG1Co… FC 1   
wK1GT9uWHn… Cg9YsQ2GRw… ACEx0SxzJVD… FC 2   
lDbiOW1L6rZR… FHqxDUjXRYR… ACEx0UYDsG9… FC 3   
ANqN1rmvlHsF… T7IUNbxY7ci0d… ACEx0UgoBXY… FC 4   
EvsI16Z+8fF8l… PxTFVzalYnt/Y… ACEx0eeeer52… FC 5   
KksQHv2yOZP… 8qzR0MtbLuek… ACEx0V2Q0dg… FC 6   
 
Table 3.2:  New Record_Nspiis Table 
 
FACE TABLE 
EDi
FCI 
ImageNR
FCI 
ColorCheck
FCI 
Emotion 
FCI 
Sequence ….. 
kXE3sFcE+Jx… 1 Y Hate 0   
wK1GT9uWHn… 1 Y Disgust 0   
lDbiOW1L6rZR… 1 N Surprise 0   
ANqN1rmvlHsF… 1 Y Unknown 0   
EvsI16Z+8fF8l… 1 N Other 0   
KksQHv2yOZP… 1 Y Laughter 0   
 
Table 3.3:  Modified Face Table 
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Chapter 4 
 
Summary 
 
4.1 Summary 
 
In this day and age, computers are an essential part of everyday life.  Subsequently, 
increasing numbers of computer applications use and store sensitive personal information 
in numerous databases.  Hackers and malicious insiders pose a large threat to individual’s 
privacy because they can possibly gain access to this personal information and use it for 
very serious crimes such as identity theft.  To minimize this threat to privacy, databases 
need to use anonymization to de-identify an individual’s sensitive attributes from any 
corresponding identifiers.  When anonymization is used, a hacker or even an insider 
could gain access to tables in a database but still not be able to reveal any extra 
information that can be used to link sensitive attributes to corresponding identifiers.  This 
increase in security is vital to protect the privacy of all individuals who have sensitive 
personal information stored in any type of database. 
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In the context of our work, we are currently anonymizing a biometric database containing 
data for six different biometric modalities including hand geometry, face, voice 
recognition, iris, palm, and fingerprint.  The motivation behind this anonymization is to 
ensure confidentiality of the individual’s whose information is stored in the BiomData 
database.  This database will be anonymized through the use of Tricryption to ensure 
confidentiality of the biometric data for all subjects stored in the database.  The 
anonymization of this database will minimize the risks of individualizing images in 
different modalities, thereby enhancing privacy for data sharing and simplifying security 
policies and administration. 
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